My own criticism of the predictions from the theory of infinitely repeated games would be more directed towards their lack of applicability in my (AFAIK) finite life.
However, if I could gain immortality only by agreeing to spend it sitting in a laboratory playing prisoner's dilemma for ever - then I think I would pass. My guess is they have a sample selection problem.
And yes, I know I'm being dumb.
And no, I'm not being serious.
Authors: Bó, Pedro Dal; Fréchette, Guillaume R.
Source: The American Economic Review,
Volume 101, Number 1, February 2011, pp. 411-429(19)
Read more at www.ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: A usual criticism of the theory of infinitely repeated games is that it does not provide sharp predictions since there may be a multiplicity of equilibria. To address this issue, we present experimental evidence on the evolution of cooperation in infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games as subjects gain experience. We show that cooperation may prevail in infinitely repeated games, but the conditions under which this occurs are more stringent than the subgame perfect conditions usually considered or even a condition based on risk dominance.